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El objetivo de este artículo es evaluar las preferen-
cias de las partes que participan en transacciones 
comerciales latinoamericanas cuando eligen el 
derecho que ha de regir sus contratos. Para ese 
propósito, los autores han conducido un análisis 
empírico de datos que pudieron ser obtenidos de 
instituciones de arbitraje activas en Latinoamérica, 
enfocado en los años 2011 y 2012. 
Asimismo ofrecen algunas reflexiones sobre los re-
sultados y evalúan si pueden ser explicados por la 
visión territorial de los conflictos de leyes en Latino-
américa, la importancia de Estados Unidos como 
socio comercial de los países latinoamericanos y el 
grado de presencia de abogados angloamericanos 
en los mercados latinoamericanos.
Palabras clave: Elección de la ley aplicable; sede 
del arbitraje; América Latina; CCI; ICDR; enfoque 
territorial; preferencias de las partes.
The aim of this Article is to assess the preferences 
of parties to Latin American international business 
transactions when they choose the law governing 
their contracts. For that purpose, the authors 
have conducted an empirical analysis of data that 
they were able to gather from arbitral institutions 
active in Latin America, with a focus on years 2011 
and 2012. 
Furthermore they offer some reflections on the 
results and elaborate on whether they can be 
explained by the territorial approach of choice of 
law in Latin America, the importance of the United 
States as a trading partner for Latin American 
countries and the extent to which Anglo-American 
lawyers are present on Latin American markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this Article is to assess the preferences 
of parties to Latin American international business 
transactions when they choose the law governing 
their contracts. For that purpose, we have con-
ducted an empirical analysis of unpublished data 
that we were able to gather from arbitral institu-
tions active in Latin America, with a focus on years 
2011 and 2012.
One of the authors had already conducted simi-
lar research on other samples revealing the con-
tractual practices in other parts of the world, in 
particular in Asia (Cuniberti, 2016).1 One aim of 
this Article is to compare our findings about Latin 
America with the findings about Asia, and to con-
firm the existence of regional variations in interna-
tional economic actors’ preferences. 
We present the results of our empirical study in 
Section II. The data, unfortunately, are incomplete, 
as many arbitral institutions have declined to share 
it. We submit, however, that our study is reason-
ably representative, in particular because the 
dominant player in Latin American arbitration –the 
International Chamber of Commerce– did cooper-
ate. We hope to be able to gather more data in the 
future, but the results of our study already allow 
us to formulate some preliminary conclusions, 
which we present in Section III. 
II.  CHOICE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICAN ARBI-
TRATION: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
It is generally delicate to assess the contractual 
practices of private actors. Private contracts are 
not published, and millions of them are conclud-
ed every day. Yet, an interesting source for that 
purpose is the data gathered by arbitral institu-
tions on cases they have handled. Arbitration is 
the dominant mode of resolution of international 
commercial disputes, and certain leading arbitral 
institutions handle large numbers of cases which 
are remarkably diverse, both from the perspective 
of the origin of the parties as well as the industries 
concerned. In addition, it appears that the data 
that they publish are, in many respects, remark-
1  A number of empirical studies of choice of law preferences were also conducted on the basis of questionnaires sent to 
economic actors: see Vogenauer (2017) and Queen Mary University of London (2010). In the United States, empirical 
studies were also conducted, but they focused on choice of law in domestic contracts, which raises entirely different ques-
tions: see Eisenberg & Miller (2009) and Sangath (2014).
2  For a wider discussion on the representativeness of the data published by the ICC, see Cuniberti (2014, p. 467).
3  In particular, there is no distinction between the law of the forum and foreign law in international arbitration. A number of 
private international law techniques which could result in the application of another law than the law chosen by the parties 
play a limited role (this is, in particular, the case of the public policy exception): this largely limits the scope of the argu-
ment made by certain scholars that Latin American courts do not respect freedom of choice because of their application 
of the public policy exception: see Pargendler (2012, p. 1730).
ably consistent over the years. It is true, of course, 
that the data of arbitral institutions are only con-
cerned with contracts which gave rise to disputes, 
and that this could be an important selection bias. 
It is hard to identify, however, which influence this 
could have on many of the terms of the relevant 
contracts and, in particular, on choice of law claus-
es. We submit, therefore, that the data of arbitral 
institutions are reasonably representative of the 
relevant contractual practices.2 
This is even more so in the context of this Article. 
Our aim is to assess the preferences of parties to 
international business transactions with respect 
to the choice of law. In Latin America, freedom of 
choice in international contracts is much more ac-
cepted in the context of arbitration than it is in a 
judicial context. This makes the study of the data 
of arbitral institutions much more meaningful, as 
parties may express more freely their preferences 
than in a judicial context.3
The definition of international contracts has long 
been a vexing issue in comparative private interna-
tional law. Because our focus is on the preferences 
of actors, we focus on, and thus define interna-
tional contracts as, contracts concluded between 
parties based in different states. 
We present in turn the data that we obtained from 
Latin American arbitral institutions and from inter-
national institutions.
A. Latin American Institutions 
1.  Background
In Latin America, the vast majority of cases filed 
with local arbitral institutions are domestic. Thus, 
most of the parties that turn to these institutions 
do not really choose the law that govern their con-
tracts, they just abide automatically to the law that 
is common to them. There is, however, an interna-
tional practice that has started to develop.
In April 2011, the Americas Initiative of the Insti-
tute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) issued a 
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tral institutions throughout the region (2011). The 
survey identified 165 local institutions from eigh-
teen different countries,4 but focused on only 30 
institutions from fifteen countries. Of particular 
interest for the purpose of this Article is the data 
collected with respect to foreign parties involved 
in arbitrations handled by these institutions.5 Out 
of the 30 institutions studied, 17 reported that 
foreign parties were involved in some cases, 6 re-
ported that no foreign parties were involved in any 
of the arbitrations they handled, and 7 did not pro-
vide any information in this respect. This practice 
is rather recent. According to the survey, 70% of 
these institutions were created between twenty 
to ten years ago, when many Latin American coun-
tries adopted new laws with the aim of fostering 
arbitration. It is reasonable to believe that, while 
consolidating during their first years, these institu-
tions were exclusively, or almost, conducting do-
mestic arbitrations. 
The ITA’s survey gives us an idea of the dimension 
of the international practice of Latin American ar-
bitral institutions. The average proportion of for-
4  This is not the total amount of arbitral institutions in the region. The survey does not say it, but we believe that this amount 
corresponds to those institutions that are permanently active and enjoy certain recognition as arbitration more than concil-
iation or mediation centers, and not to every single arbitral institution authorized in each country. Only in Colombia, there 
are about 330 authorized arbitral institutions, most of which function primarily as conciliation centers, as it was pointed 
out by Rafael Bernal Gutiérrez, Vice-President of the Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación of the Chamber of Commerce of 
Bogotá, in an interview with La República, the leading economic newspaper in the country (Arteaga, 2014). 
5  The survey appears ambiguous as to the caseloads of the institutions. It raises the question of whether they correspond 
to the number of pending cases at the moment when the data was collected or to the total of cases ever handled. Most 
of the caseloads seem to be collected under the first methodology. They go in line with the number of cases received by 
year. But others do not seem to correspond to this logic. For example, one institution appears with 546 cases and another 
with 1380, while receiving 50 and 150 per year (during a period rather close to the survey, and not during the first years 
of functioning), respectively. These caseloads seem to correspond to a much longer period of time. The Centro de Arbi-
tragem e Mediação of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) Brazil is a local institution that used to publish its 
statistics. They confirm that the survey is also based on the second methodology. By 2011, this institution had received a 
total of 50 cases, just as it is stated in the survey (Estatística do Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação em 2015, in file with 
the authors). Given this ambiguity, we will refer to these caseloads and the data ensuing therefrom without any relation to 
a specific period of time.
6  For example, see the cases reported by the Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá 
below.
7  Actually, the survey’s data concerning foreign parties contains, to some extent, parties that are not foreign. Despite des-
ignating as foreign parties those that are established abroad (ITA, 2011, p. 12), the survey does include local subsidiaries 
of multinational companies. It is the case, for example, of the Centro de Arbitraje y Mediación of AMCHAM Quito, whose 
percentage of foreign parties is 29 according to the survey. This institution provided us with information on choice of law. 
Its Director told us, in one of the e-mails exchanged (in file with the authors), that the majority of those parties are local 
subsidiaries of multinational companies. Counting local subsidiaries of multinational companies as if they were foreign 
parties would be commonplace in the survey. By some conversations by mail and on the phone with other institutions, 
when asked about data concerning foreign companies, we noticed that some of them take local subsidiaries as one if the 
majority of the shares are held by foreigners, or are simply not sure whether to take these companies into account. Yet, 
many Latin American arbitration laws provide that an arbitration is international if the parties to the arbitration agreement 
are established in different countries. 
8  They are, from the most to the less active, the Centro de Arbitraje y Mediación (CAM) of the Ecuadorian-American Cham-
ber of Commerce - Quito, the Centro de Arbitraje de México (CAM), the Centro de Arbitraje (CACC) of the Chamber of 
Caracas, the Centro Internacional de Arbitraje of the American Chamber of Commerce of Peru (AMCHAM Peru), the 
Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) Brazil, the Centro de Arbitragem e 
Mediação (CAM-CCBC) of the Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce, the Centro Empresarial de Conciliación y Arbitraje 
(CEDCA) of the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the Câmara de Arbitragem Empre-
sarial - Brasil (CAMARB), the Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado (CAM - BM&FBOVESPA), the Centro de Conciliación 
y Arbitraje (CCA) of the Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica, the Centro de Mediación y Arbitraje of the Chamber of 
Commerce, Services and Tourism of Mexico City (CANACO) and the Câmara de Mediação e Arbitragem (ARBITAC) of 
the Commercial Association of Paraná.
eign parties in cases handled by the 17 institutions 
which reported an international practice is 16%. 
We cannot assume, however, that this percentage 
is also the percentage of international cases of this 
caseload. This would only be possible if there were 
only one foreign party per arbitration, and this is 
often not the case.6 Thus, the percentage of for-
eign parties in the caseload of a given institution 
does not translate into the number of internation-
al cases. The aggregate number of cases handled 
by the 17 institutions was 3,483. They included, 
therefore, less than 557 international cases, and 
indeed probably much less.7 This still shows, how-
ever, that, as a whole, Latin American arbitral insti-
tutions are developing an international practice of 
significant dimension.
As exaggerated as it might be, the criterion of the 
number of foreign parties also allows us to com-
pare the dimension of the international practice of 
each institution. From the 17 institutions with for-
eign parties in their caseloads,8 only 5 would have 
more than 20 international parties participating. 
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far, the Centro de Mediación y Arbitraje (CAM) of 
the Chamber of Commerce of Santiago, Chile, with 
about 100 foreign parties participating.9 These fig-
ures suggest that most Latin American institutions 
only receive a handful of international cases in a 
given year, and that they may not receive year in 
and year out. 
 
Though the survey dates back to the beginning of 
2011, it can still reflect a more actual picture of 
the international practice of Latin American insti-
tutions.10 If there is no doubt that as a whole, arbi-
tration is a phenomenon on the rise in the region, 
it is less clear whether the international cases are 
also growing at a fast pace.11 The data on choice 
of law that we will present suggest that it has not 
been the case. 
2.  Choice of Law 
Only six Latin American institutions provided us 
with data on choice of law. All in all, they cover 
44 international cases in an average time span of 
3 years between 2011 and 2016. Despite numer-
ous efforts, several other local institutions did not 
provide us with this information.12 The data will 
also show that the international practice of Latin 
9  From a total of 1,380 cases. The other four are, in this order, the Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de Panamá (CeCAP) 
of the Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Agriculture of Panama, the Centro Internacional de Conciliación y Arbitraje 
(CICA) of the Costa Rican-American Chamber of Commerce, the Centro de Arbitraje of the Chamber of Commerce of 
Lima (CCL) and the Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje Comercial (CCAC) of the Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Ser-
vices and Tourism of Santa Cruz - Bolivia.
10  It is however reasonable to consider that now there might be other local institutions that handle international arbitrations 
apart from the 17 of the survey, like the Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación (CAC) of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota, 
which provided us with data on choice of law. Not to count that it would be hard to believe that the survey did not miss 
institutions that had already handled international cases. 
11  Karin Helmlinger, former Executive Director of CAM Santiago, the most active institution according to the survey, noted, in 
an interview with the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio in 2013 –one of the oldest Spanish language newspapers currently 
distributed– that this kind of arbitration was still growing but only by little (Chaparro, 2013). 
12  These are all the ones referred to in note 9, except the CCAC of the Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Services and 
Tourism of Santa Cruz - Bolivia, as well as all the ones mentioned in note 8, except the CAM of the Ecuadorian-American 
Chamber of Commerce - Quito, the Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação of AMCHAM Brazil, the Centro de Arbitraje de 
México and the CACC of the Chamber of Caracas, as well as the CCA of the Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica and 
ARBITAC of the Commercial Association of Paraná, which we did not contact, plus the Câmara de Conciliação, Mediação 
e Arbitragem of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (CIESP/FIESP), the Centro Brasileiro de Mediação 
e Arbitragem (CBMA), the Centro de Mediación y Arbitraje Comercial (CEMARC) of the Argentinean Chamber of Com-
merce and Services and the Centro de Arbitraje y Mediación Paraguay (CAMP) of the National Chamber of Commerce 
and Services of Paraguay, which are not included in the survey as institutions with a percentage of foreign parties or are 
not included in it at all, but we thought worth to contact. Additionally, we contacted also without success, the Comisión 
Interamericana de Arbitraje Comercial (CIAC), which is a global institution of the region. 
13  We sincerely thank former Executive Director Mrs. Adriana Vaamonde.
American institutions seems to remain similar after 
2011, i.e., in general, local institutions do not han-
dle many international cases. After presenting the 
data, we will draw some conclusions on the choice 
of law of parties that turn to this kind of institutions 
to have their international disputes settled. 
The Latin American arbitral institutions that pro-
vided us with data on choice of law are based in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Ven-
ezuela. 
a. The Centro de Arbitraje of the Chamber of 
Caracas (CACC)
The CACC was created in 1989 but has been work-
ing without interruption since 1998. By 2016, it 
reported to have administered more than 450 
cases and it has been presented as one of the two 
most active Venezuelan arbitral institutions (Sa-
ghy, 2018, p. 3). It ranks third in terms of caseload 
among the 30 institutions included in the ITA’s sur-
vey, with 277 cases.
 
The CACC provided us with information on choice 
of law for the international cases that it received 
from 2011 until August 2016.13 
Table 1: CACC International Cases, 2011-2016
2011 2012
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen law
U.S. vs.Venezuelan Caracas Venezuelan Venezuelan vs. Colombian Caracas Venezuelan
Venezuelan vs. Venezuelan 
and Panamenian Caracas Venezuelan
Venezuelan vs. Venezuelan 
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2014 2015
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen law
Venezuelan vs. U.S. Caracas Venezuelan Venezuelan vs. Brazilian Caracas Venezuelan
Venezuelan vs. U.S. Caracas Venezuelan 2016
Venezuelan vs. Venezuelan 
and Panamanian Caracas Venezuelan Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen law
Venezuelan vs. Venezuelan 
and Panamanian Caracas Venezuelan Venezuelan vs. Portuguese Caracas Venezuelan
Venezuelan vs. Venezuelan 
and Panamanian Caracas Venezuelan Venezuelan vs. Portuguese Caracas Venezuelan
Venezuelan vs. Venezuelan 
and Panamanian Caracas Venezuelan Venezuelan vs. Brazilian Caracas Venezuelan
14  For which, we thank Mrs. Verónica Romero Chacín, former Head of Arbitration, and Mrs. Isabel Victoria Galván R., former 
Coordinator of the School of International Arbitration. 
15  We are very much grateful to Dr. Fernanda Pires Merouço, former Deputy Secretary General. 
b.  The Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación (CAC) 
of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota 
(CCB)
The CAC was the first Colombian arbitral institu-
tion. It was created in 1983. It is one of the most 
active local institutions in Colombia (Zuleta, 2012, 
p. 1; World Bank, 2010, p. 101), and perhaps, the 
most active when it comes to international arbitra-
tion. In the ITA’s survey, it appeared with a case-
load of 202 cases and ranked seventh in this re-
spect among the 30 institutions therein included. 
The CAC informed us that it did not handle an in-
ternational arbitration before 2014. In this year, 6 
international cases were filed with it. It received 5 
more during 2015. It provided us with information 
on choice of law for all of these cases.14 
Table 2: CAC International Cases, 2014-2015
2014 2015
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen law
Colombian vs. Panamanian Colombia Colombian Colombian vs. Panamanian Colombia Colombian
Colombian vs. Brazilian Colombia Colombian Colombian vs. Mexican Colombia Colombian
U.S. vs. Colombian Colombia Colombian Colombian vs. Mexican Colombia Colombian
Chinese vs. Colombian Colombia Colombian Colombian (x5) vs. Brazilian (x2) Colombia Colombian
Colombian vs. Venezuelan Colombia Colombian Peruvian vs. Canadian and Colombian Colombia Colombian
Chinese (x2) vs. Colombian 
(x2) Colombia Colombian
c. The Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação of 
the American Chamber of Commerce (AM-
CHAM) Brazil
AMCHAM Brazil is established in São Paulo and 
has offices in fourteen other Brazilian cities, 
where arbitrations also take place. The center 
was created in 2000, but it received its first ar-
bitration in 2002. It has been referred as one of 
the eight most commonly used local institutions, 
from a universe of more than 100 (Gonçalves & 
Spaccaquerche Barbosa, 2013, p. 1). By 2015 it 
had handled a total of 90 arbitrations (Centro de 
Arbitragem e Mediação – AmCham, 2015). In the 
ITA’s survey it ranked twentieth, with 49 cases 
by 2011. 
AMCHAM Brazil provided us with information 
on choice of law for the international cases that 
it received in 2013 and 2015, and further speci-
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Table 3: AMCHAM Brazil International Cases 2011-2015
2013 2015
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen law
Brazilian and U.S. São Paulo Brazilian Brazilian and U.S. São Paulo Brazilian
Brazilian and Kuwaiti São Paulo Brazilian
16  By 2017, there were 15 authorized arbitral institutions in Ecuador.
17  We warmly thank Mrs. Patricia Vera Nieto, Director.
18  We are grateful to Mrs. Sylvia Sámano Beristain, LL.M.
These international cases represent respectively 
20% and 11% of the total of cases received in each 
of these years. In these years, the center received 
a total of 10 and 9 cases, respectively (Centro de 
Arbitragem e Mediação – AmCham, 2015). 
d.  The Centro de Arbitraje y Mediación (CAM) 
of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of 
Commerce (AMCHAM) Quito 
The center was created in 1999. It is one of the most 
important Ecuadorian arbitral institutions (Consejo 
de la Judicatura, 2017).16 It is the only institution 
from Ecuador included in the ITA’s survey, where it 
ranked sixteenth in terms of caseload, with 70 cases. 
AMCHAM Quito provided us with information on 
choice of law for the international cases filed with 
it in 2011 and 2012.17 
Table 4: AMCHAM Quito International Cases 2011-2012
2011 2012
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen law
Ecuadorian vs. Spanish Ecuador Ecuadorian Colombian vs. U.S. Ecuador Ecuadorian
U.S. vs. Ecuadorian Ecuador Ecuadorian German vs. Ecuadorian Ecuador Ecuadorian
Chinese vs. Ecuadorian Ecuador Ecuadorian Ecuadorian vs. Spanish Ecuador Ecuadorian
Spanish vs. U.S. Ecuador Ecuadorian
e.  The Centro de Arbitraje de México (CAM)
The CAM was established in Mexico City in 1997. 
It is one of the three most important arbitral in-
stitutions of Mexico (von Wobeser, 2018, p. 1). 
It appears as the seventeenth most active in-
stitution in the ITA’s survey, with 62 cases. 
The CAM provided us with information on choice 
of law for the international cases that it received 
from 2011 to 2015.18
Table 5: CAM International Cases, 2011-2015
2011 2012
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen law
Mexican and U.S. Mexico City Mexican Mexican and Brazilian Mexico City Mexican
2014 2015
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen law
Mexican and Canadian Mexico City Mexican Mexican and U.S. Mexico City Mexican
f.  The Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje Co-
mercial (CCAC) of the Chamber of Industry, 
Commerce, Services and Tourism of Santa 
Cruz - Bolivia (CAINCO)
The CCAC was created in 1993. It is one of the 
most active arbitral institutions of Bolivia, if not 
the most (World Bank, 2010). It is the only Bolivian 
institution that appears in the ITA’s survey, ranking 
twelfth from the 30 institutions included in it, with 
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Table 6: CCAC International Cases 2011-2014
2012 2013
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law Nationality of the parties
Seat of the 
arbitration Chosen Law
Ecuadorian vs. Bolivian Bolivia Bolivian Bolivian vs. Chinese Bolivia Bolivian
2014
Nationality of the parties Seat of the arbitration Chosen law
Chinese vs. Bolivian Bolivia Bolivian
Chinese vs. Bolivian Bolivia Bolivian
Bolivian vs. Paraguayan Bolivia Bolivian
19  We are very much grateful to Mrs. Claudia Paccieri Rojas, Executive Director.
20  This is the case, for instance, of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitra-
tion Institution. Parties originating from Central and South America accounted for 4.8% of parties in 2019 (4.7% in 2018; 
1.9% in 2017; 3.4% in 2016; 2.5% in 2015) in arbitrations handled by the LCIA (LCIA, 2019, p. 10; LCIA, 2017, p. 6). The 
statistics of the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution does not even report separately that some of the parties involved 
in the arbitrations that it handles originate from Latin America (they are included in Others) (SCAI, 2019, p. 3).
The CCAC provided us with information on choice 
of law for the international cases filed with it in 
2012, 2013 and 2014. It also let us know that it did 
not receive an international case in 2011.19
g.  Conclusion
The data available are few but remarkably consis-
tent. All 44 cases had three common features. The 
first is that the seat of the arbitration was in the 
country where the local arbitral institution was 
based. The second is that the law chosen by the 
parties was the law of that same country. The third 
was that the seat of the arbitration and the law 
chosen by the parties coincided. Finally, virtually 
all 44 cases (42 out 44) had in common that one 
party was a national from the country where the 
local arbitration institution was based. Although 
it would have been interesting to study the data 
from other local institutions, it is likely that they 
would share the same features.
The authors submit that a likely explanation for 
some of these features is that local arbitral institu-
tions are chosen by the parties where a local party 
has a strong bargaining power and is thus able to 
dictate many of the contractual terms, including 
the jurisdiction and choice of law clauses. The lo-
cal party thus imposes on the other party the lo-
cal arbitral institution, a seat in its country and the 
application of the local law. This is not to say that 
Latin American arbitral institutions favor local par-
ties, and even less that the law of Latin American 
institutions favor the same, but rather that Latin 
American parties with a higher bargaining power 
prefer to litigate in a forum that they know and 
which is easily accessible, and under a law they are 
familiar with. 
B. International Institutions 
Latin American parties do not only resort to Latin 
American arbitral institutions. Indeed, it seems 
that most international cases involving Latin Amer-
ican parties are handled by international arbitral 
institutions. Two international institutions have a 
significant activity in this market: the International 
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) and the International Center 
for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), which is the inter-
national division of the American Arbitration As-
sociation. The data published by most other inter-
national institutions reveal that they barely handle 
cases involving Latin American parties.20 
1. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
a. Background
Contrary to Latin American arbitral institutions, 
the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC is 
a global institution which is not specifically focused 
on Latin America. However, it is an important play-
er in Latin American arbitration which handles 
both arbitrations with a seat in Latin America and 
arbitrations involving Latin American parties with a 
seat outside of this region. 
In 2011 and 2012, Latin American parties were 
involved in respectively 81 and 95 ICC cases, but 
only 37 and 46 arbitrations had their seat in Latin 
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involving Latin American parties is in Latin America 
in around 45 % of the cases, and that most ICC 
Latin American arbitrations are thus held outside 
such region.
Table 7: Number of Cases and Parties, 2011-2012
2011 2012
ICC Cases involving a Latin American Party 81 95
Number of Latin American Parties involved in an ICC Case 180 205
Table 8: Latin American Seats in ICC Arbitrations, 2010-2013
2010 2011 2012 2013
Brazil 11 16 17 22
Mexico 13 11 12 9
Chile 3 2 5 4
Argentina 6 4 2 3
Panama 0 1 2 2
Uruguay 1 1 1 0
Peru 0 0 2 0
Bolivia 0 1 0 1
Venezuela 0 1 0 0
Colombia 0 0 1 3
Ecuador 0 0 1 0
El Salvador 0 0 1 0
Honduras 0 0 1 1
Costa Rica 0 0 1 0
Total 34 37 46 45
An important feature of arbitration in Latin Amer-
ica is that parties often agree to resort to arbitra-
tion to resolve disputes involving parties of the 
same nationality. The data that the ICC publishes 
each year about the cases that it handles indicate 
that the proportion of single nationality cases is of-
ten high among Latin American countries. In par-
ticular, 33 to 45% of ICC cases involving Brazilian 
parties are single nationality cases. Unfortunately, 
the ICC only reports about countries which have a 
proportion of single nationality cases higher than a 
certain level, which changes each year. From 2010 
to 2012, the threshold was respectively 20, 21 and 
22 %. In 2013, it was 40%. It is thus not possible to 
know whether there were a lower proportion of 
single nationality cases in other countries, or sim-
ply none, during these years. The only exception 
is for nationalities which were involved in such a 
low number of cases that one single case would 
be above the threshold. For instance, if there were 
less than 5 cases in which parties of a given na-
tionality were involved in 2010 to 2012, this would 
mean that none of them was a single nationality 
case, as one case would account for 25 % of all 
cases involving parties from that country.
The following results can thus be deduced from 
data published by the ICC.
Table 9: Latin American Single Nationality cases in ICC Arbitrations, 2010-2013
2010 2011 2012 2013
Brazil 11 (42 %) 10 (33 %) 10 (34 %) 18 (45 %)
Mexico Less than 20 % Less than 21 % 8 (35 %) 7 (41 %)
Chile 3 (75 %) Less than 21 % Less than 22 % Less than 40 %
Argentina 3 (60 %) 2 (22 %) 2 (22 %) Less than 40 %
Uruguay 1 (50 %) 0 0 Less than 40 %
Peru 0 0 4 (80 %) 2 (66 %)
Bolivia 0 1 (50 %) 0 Less than 40 %
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2010 2011 2012 2013
Honduras 0 0 1 (100 %) Less than 40 %
Ecuador 0 0 Less than 22 % 0
Venezuela Less than 20 % 0 0 0
Guatemala 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0
Colombia 0 Less than 21 % Less than 22 % Less than 40 %
Panama Less than 20 % Less than 21 % Less than 22 % Less than 40 %
Table 10: Nationality of Latin American Parties to ICC Arbitrations, 2010-2013
2010 2011 2012 2013
Brazil 74 (38 %) 81 (45 %) 82 (40 %) 91 (42.3 %)
Mexico 62 (31%) 28 (15.5 %) 44 (21.4 %) 47 (28.8 %)
Argentina 16 (8.2 %) 18 (10 %) 14 (6.8 %) 19 (8.8 %)
Panama 7 (3.6 %) 13 (7.2 %) 12 (5.8 %) 11
Chile 9 (4.6 %) 12 (6.6 %) 13 (6.3 %) 10
Colombia 1 (0.5 %) 10 (5.5 %) 11 (5.3 %) 17 (7.9 %)
Peru 0 2 (1.1 %) 11 (5.3 %) 5
El Salvador 6 (3 %) 4 (2.2 %) 11 (3.7 %) 0
Ecuador 1 (0.5 %) 0 7 (3.4 %) 0
Bolivia 0 4 (2.2 %) 0 1
Venezuela 11 (5.6 %) 3 (1.6 %) 1 (0.4 %) 1
Uruguay 4 (2 %) 1 (0.5 %) 3 (1.4 %) 9
Honduras 1 (0.5 %) 1 (0.5 %) 2 (0.9 %) 0
Guatemala 2 2 (1.1 %) 0 2
Costa Rica 0 1 (0.5 %) 1 (0.4 %) 2
Nicaragua 0 0 1 (0.4 %) 0
Total 194 180 205 215
21  That is, cases with no connection to other jurisdictions, such as the domicile of the parties or the place of conclusion or 
performance of the contract.
22  This was the case for Honduras in 2012. The ICC reported that the only case involving parties from Honduras in 2012 
was a single nationality case, and the data revealed that a seat in Honduras had only been selected once. The parties 
had not chosen the applicable law, in most likelihood because it was obvious to them that Honduras law would apply to a 
domestic case.
b.  Choice of Law
We are also grateful to the ICC for providing us 
with detailed data on choice of law in arbitrations 
involving Latin American parties filed with the ICC 
in 2011 and 2012. More specifically, the ICC pro-
vided the seat of the arbitration and the law cho-
sen by the parties for each of the 81 and 95 cases 
filed respectively during these two years. 
 
It must be underscored again, however, that a 
number of these cases were single nationality 
cases. This is important, because parties to single 
nationality cases all originate from the same juris-
diction, and are thus very likely to provide for the 
application of the law which is known to all them.
Additionally, single nationality cases will often be 
domestic cases21 where the power of the parties 
to provide for the application of foreign law will 
be doubtful. It is therefore useful to break the 
data and present separately cases involving par-
ties of different nationalities. This could easily be 
done where the data indicated that the only case 
involving parties from a given country was a single 
nationality case, and a seat in this country had 
only been selected once.22 For other countries, 
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was therefore made to identify them. Parties to 
single nationality cases would either select a seat 
of the arbitration and provide for the applica-
tion of the law of the same jurisdiction, or select 
the seat in the same jurisdiction and then omit 
to indicate the applicable law.23 We find that the 
23  For anecdotal evidence of the fact that parties to single nationality cases might not care for choosing the applicable law, 
see previous note.
24  In 2011, parties to ICC arbitrations involving Asian parties had chosen non-Asian laws in 61% of cases where the parties 
had chosen a law (44.3% of all cases) and had chosen Asian laws in only 37% of such cases (26.7% of all cases). In 
2012, parties to ICC arbitrations involving Asian parties had chosen non-Asian laws in 56.6% of cases where the parties 
had chosen a law (45.4% of all cases) and had chosen Asian laws in only 42% of such cases (34.6% of all cases).
ICC handled respectively 66 and 69 international 
cases involving Latin American parties in 2011 
and 2012.
We present the data for both all cases and interna-
tional cases in Table 11. 
Table 11: Substantive Law Chosen in ICC Latin American Arbitrations, 2011-2012
2011 2012
All cases Int’l cases All cases Int’l cases
Brazilian law 15 7 10.6% 19 11 16%
Mexican law 10 10 15.1% 12 4 5.8%
U.S. laws 7 7 10.6% 10.5 10.5 15.2%
Chilean law 2 2 3% 8 8 11.6%
Argentinian law 6 4 6% 2 1 1.4%
English law 4 4 6% 2.5 2.5 3.6%
Swiss law 2 2 3% 2 2 2.8%
French law 2 2 3% 2 2 2.8%
Other non-Lat Am laws 8 8 12% 4 4 5.8%
Panamanian law 2 2 3% 1 1 1.4%
Peruvian law 1 1 1.5% 2 0 0
Salvadorian law 2 0 0 1 0 0
Ecuadorian law 0 0 0 2 2 2.8%
Uruguayan law 1 1 1.5% 0 0 0
Guatemalan 1 1 1.5% 0 0 0
Columbian law 0 0 0 1 1 1.4%
Bolivian law 1 0 0 0 0 0
Non-national law 2 2 3% 4 4 5.8%
Unspecified 15 13 19.7% 22 16 23.1%
TOTAL 81 66 100% 95 69 100%
The first lesson that the data teach is that Latin 
American laws are often chosen. They were cho-
sen in 28 cases both in 2011 and 2012. This repre-
sented respectively 42% and 40% of international 
cases. If one focuses on cases where the parties 
had actually made a choice (and thus neglect cas-
es where no choice was specified), parties chose 
Latin American laws in 53% of cases. While laws 
of non-Latin American countries are also regularly 
chosen, in around 40% of cases where the parties 
had actually made a choice, they do not dominate.
 
The situation is different in other parts of the 
world. A previous study conducted by one of the 
authors (Cuniberti, 2016) revealed that parties 
to international arbitrations in Asia choose much 
more often laws of non-Asian states than laws 
of Asian states. The ICC data for the same period 
show parties to arbitrations involving Asian par-
ties chose the laws of non-Asian states in around 
60% of cases and chose the laws of Asian states in 
around 40% cases.24
The second lesson, which is correlated to the first, 
is that Latin American international business trans-
actions are not dominated by the law of an influ-
ential jurisdiction of the northern hemisphere. In 
particular, English and Swiss laws, which dominate 
international business transactions in other parts 
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to be very influential in Latin America. U.S. laws are 
chosen more often, but they do not dominate. In 
contrast, English law dominates Asian internation-
al business transactions, where it is chosen twice 
as often as any Asian law (Cuniberti, 2016, p. 54).25
c.  Combination Seat-Law
One of the two most important lessons of data of 
Latin American arbitral institutions was the corre-
lation between the seat of the arbitration and the 
25  In 2011 and 2012, parties to ICC arbitrations involving Asian parties had chosen English law in respectively 11.6% and 17.7% 
of cases, while the most chosen Asian law (Indian law) had only been chosen in respectively 5.5% and 8.2% of cases.
26 Including one case where the parties had chosen both UK and US laws.
27 Not including two domestic Salvadorian cases.
law chosen to govern the dispute on the merits 
(see supra II.A.).
The data provided by the ICC for years 2011 and 
2012 confirm this important trend of Latin Ameri-
can arbitration. In Table 12, we present the dis-
tribution of cases where the parties had actually 
chosen both the seat of the arbitration and the 
law governing the substance of the dispute (we 
exclude, therefore, cases where the parties had 
neglected to choose one or the other).
Table 12: Combination of Seat and Substantive Law in ICC Arbitrations, 2011-2012
2011 2012
Number of cases % of choices Number of cases % of choices
Same country
Latin America 22 42.3% 18 33.9%
United States 6 11.5% 1026 18.8%
Europe 5 9.6% 7 13.2%
Lebanon 0 0 1 1.8%
Different countries
Seat Latin America 2 3.8% 1 1.8%
Seat United States 627 11.5% 2 3.7%
Seat Canada 0 0 1 1.8%
Seat France 8 15.4% 7 13.2%
Seat other Europe 3 5.7% 2 3.7%
Total 52 100% 53 100%
The data reveal first that parties to ICC arbitrations 
will designate the same jurisdiction for choice 
of law purposes and as the seat of the arbitra-
tion in more than 60% of cases. Given that there 
is, in principle, no reason for combining the two, 
this seems remarkably high. It begs the question 
of whether there is some reluctance among Latin 
American parties to choose foreign law in any ad-
judication (see infra III).
Table 13: Latin American Seats in ICC Arbitrations, 2011-2012
2011 2012
Int’l cases Same law chosen Int’l cases Same law chosen
Brazil 8 7 7 7
Mexico 11 9 4 2
Chile 2 2 5 5
Argentina 2 2 0 0
Panama 1 1 2 1
Uruguay 1 1 1 0
Venezuela 1 0 0 0
Colombia 0 0 1 1
Ecuador 0 0 1 1
Costa Rica 0 0 1 0
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While most parties to international arbitrations 
understand the importance of and the difference 
between the seat of the arbitration and the law 
governing the merits, there is still a significant pro-
portion of cases where parties omit to provide for 
the applicable law, including cases where they also 
fail to choose the seat of the arbitration. These 
cases are summarized below.
Table 14: Cases with Choice of Seat but not Law in ICC Arbitrations
2011 2012
Domestic cases Int’l cases Domestic cases Int’l cases
Choice of seat only
Seat in Latin America 2  3 1
Seat in the United States 2 4 6
Seat in France 1 3
Seat in other European S. 4  3
No choice of seat 
No choice of law 2 2 3 3
Choice of law 0 0  0 0
Total 2 13 6 16
The data reveal that parties omit to provide for 
the applicable law in about 20% of cases. This pro-
portion is not higher in Latin American arbitration 
than it is in arbitrations involving parties based in 
other parts of the world. It is similar to the aver-
age proportion of choice of law in ICC arbitration 
generally (Cuniberti, 2014, p. 468).
2.  The International Center for Dispute Resolu-
tion (ICDR)
As the ICC, the ICDR, which is the international di-
vision American Arbitration Association, is a global 
institution which is not specifically focused on Lat-
in America. However, it is an important player in 
Latin American arbitration which handles a signifi-
cant number of arbitrations involving Latin Ameri-
can parties. 
We are grateful to the ICDR for providing us some 
data about its Latin American caseload in years 
2011 and 2012. 
Table 15: Nationality of Latin American Parties to ICDR Arbitrations, 2011-2012
2011 2012
Mexico 28 (26.4%) 30 (26.5%)
Brazil 18 (17%) 11 (9.7%)
Colombia 12 (11.3%) 10 (8.8%)
Peru 9 (8.5%) 8 (7%)
Panama 11 (10,4%) 5 (4.4%)
Costa Rica 6 (5,6%) 6 (5.3%)
Honduras 5 (4,7%) 7 (6.2%)
Chile 2 (1,9%) 3 (2.6%)
Nicaragua 5 (4,7% 7 (6.2%)
Venezuela 0 8 (7%)
Bolivia 4 (3,7%) 3 (2.6%)
Argentina 3 (2,8%) 3 (2.6%)
Ecuador 0 5 (4.4%)
Guatemala 2 (1,9%) 1 (0.9%)
Uruguay 1 (0,9%) 2 (1.8%)
El Salvador 0 2 (1.8%)
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Unfortunately, more precise data on these cases 
were unavailable. However, some general features 
of ICDR arbitration are known. The first is that the 
vast majority of ICDR cases have their seat in the 
United States (ICDR, 2016, p. 7).28 The second is 
that, in the vast majority of cases, one party origi-
nates from the U.S. (ICDR, 2016, p. 7; ICDR, 2018, 
p. 1).29 This means that most ICDR Latin American 
cases (probably about 90%) are likely to oppose a 
U.S. party to a Latin American party, and have their 
seat in the U.S. 
The ICDR has never reported on the law chosen 
by the parties to ICDR arbitration. There are sev-
eral reasons to believe, however, that, in the vast 
majority of cases, the law of a U.S. state applies. 
The first reason is that, in most cases, one of the 
parties was a U.S. party, and that the negotiation 
dynamics resulted in the choice of a U.S. seat and 
the choice of a U.S. arbitral institution. It is likely 
that the same negotiation dynamics would also be 
used to settle on the law of a U.S. state. The sec-
ond reason is that it is the general trend in Latin 
American arbitration, including ICC arbitration.30 
III.  SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PREFERENCES 
OF LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES
A. Territorial Approach
A striking feature of Latin American arbitrations 
is the willingness of parties to associate the seat 
of the arbitration with a choice of the substantive 
law of the same state. The data presented above 
reveal that this is almost systematically the case in 
arbitrations held under the aegis of Latin American 
institutions, and that this is the case in more than 
60% of ICC arbitrations. Yet, the seat of the arbitra-
tion and the law governing the merits of a case are 
conceptually different. They serve different func-
tions, and parties to international arbitrations may 
choose them independently from each other.
There are three possible reasons for the Latin 
American trend to associate the seat and the 
law governing the merits of the arbitration. The 
first could be a lack of sophistication of the par-
ties. Parties to international commercial transac-
tions will typically not have any legal education, 
and they might not be advised by lawyers. When 
advised by lawyers, these lawyers will typically be 
transactional lawyers, or in-house lawyers, who 
28  For 2015, ICDR reported that only 109 cases out of 1064 cases filed had their seat outside of the U.S., i.e. 10%.
29  For 2015, ICDR reported that less than 10% of cases (97 out of 1064) did not include a U.S. party. For 2018, the ICDR 
reported that about half of all parties originated from the U.S. (1067 U.S. parties vs 1011 non-U.S. parties).
30  In the context of the study of one of the authors on Asia, this was also confirmed by a number of practitioners (Cuniberti, 
2016).
might have limited knowledge of the complexities 
of conflict of laws and doctrines of international 
commercial arbitration. As a result, the parties and 
their lawyers might not see clearly the difference 
between the venue of an arbitration and the ap-
plicable law, and even less between choosing the 
seat of the arbitration for the purpose of choos-
ing the lex arbitri and choosing the substantive 
law. While it is inevitable that some of the parties 
lack legal sophistication and fail to understand 
this fundamental conceptual difference, in Latin 
America or elsewhere, it is difficult to believe that 
such a proportion of parties to Latin American ar-
bitrations would be in this situation. It is therefore 
submitted that lack of sophistication cannot fully 
explain this phenomenon.
The second possible reason is that parties to in-
ternational transactions typically prefer to litigate 
at home under their own law, with which they are 
familiar. As a consequence, when their bargaining 
power allows, they typically try to impose that dis-
putes be resolved in their home state under the 
law of their state of origin. Under that explana-
tion, the association seat/substantive law would 
often reveal the stronger bargaining power of one 
of the parties. 
The third possible reason would be peculiar to 
Latin America, and might thus at least partially ex-
plain why the phenomenon is so strong in this part 
of the world. Latin America has traditionally distin-
guished itself by a territorial approach to choice of 
law and a reluctance to accept freedom of choice, 
in particular in international contracts. Historically, 
Latin American states would only apply local law 
and they would not accept that the parties choose 
the law governing their contract. Although the 
situation has changed in certain Latin American 
states, in particular in the context of international 
arbitration, it is possible that the idea of territorial-
ity remains deeply ingrained in the mind of Latin 
American businessmen and lawyers. This could ex-
plain why Latin American actors continue to find it 
natural to provide for the application of “local” law 
which, in the context of international arbitration, 
would be interpreted as the designation of the law 
of the seat of the arbitration. 
The territorial approach to choice of law has deep 
roots in Latin America. The colonies of Spain were 
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torial character that goes back to the feudal period 
and even before.31 This inherited approach to con-
flicts of laws became very appealing in the region 
in the early XIX century at the time of the wars for 
independence. It also helped the new constituted 
states as part of an ideological defense against the 
colonial powers when the latter tried to reconquer 
their old territories. The Chilean Constitution of 
1812, one of the first constitutions of the conti-
nent, was particularly eloquent when referring 
to the rejection of foreign laws. It stated that “no 
decree, providence or order emanating from any 
authority or Tribunal from outside the territory of 
Chile, will be given effect; and those who tried to 
give them any value, will be punished as prison-
ers of the State” (Article 5). Also, the vast majority 
of the Hispanic American countries kept the ter-
ritorial Spanish civil laws way after independence 
(Pereznieto Castro, 1985, p. 326; Samtleben, 1979, 
pp. 177-178),32 and those which changed them 
quickly, adopted legal systems based on territorial-
ism (Samtleben, 1979, p. 179).33 
The private law systems of Latin America were 
deeply shaped in a territorial manner by the think-
ing and the works of Venezuelan Andrés Bello and 
Argentinean Dalmacio Vélez Sarsfield. Both men 
lived their early lives in the transition period from 
subordination to emancipation, hence the ide-
als of freedom and independence were natural 
in them. Andrés Bello was strongly influenced by 
the Dutch doctrine (Pereznieto Castro, 1985, p. 
329).34 He captured his ideas in his Principios de 
derecho de jentes of 1832, and then in the Chil-
ean Civil Code of 1855, which he drafted.35 Bello 
formulated the principle of the territoriality of 
the laws in an unequivocal way in article 14 of the 
Chilean Civil Code: “The law is obligatory to all the 
31  Indeed, despite the existence of a Derecho Indiano, which was a legal system created having regard to the specifici-
ties and the needs of the colonial societies, Spanish law was the main source of private law in the American colonies 
(Guzmán Brito, 2000, pp. 104-106). For the territorial character of ancient Spanish law, see Pereznieto Castro (1985, 
pp. 323-325) and Samtleben (1979, pp. 174-179). These authors agree that this characteristic of Spanish law goes back 
to the Liber Iudiciorum, which was a legal text from the Visigoth period (VII century) that unified the law of the Iberian 
Peninsula for the first time. It stated: “From now on, we do not want either Roman laws or foreign laws to be used”. 
32  Cuba and Puerto Rico gained their independences in 1898. They were the last Hispanic American states to obtain free-
dom. The same ancient Spanish law that applied in the other colonies applied to them until 1889, when the new Spanish 
Civil Code was promulgated. This code applied in Cuba until 1987 and it still influences the law of Puerto Rico (Guzmán 
Brito, 2000, pp. 143-146). In its origins, the 1889 Spanish Civil Code – still in force –, also presented territorial traits, but 
they have practically disappeared after plenty of reforms. 
33  It was the case of the Civil Code of the Mexican State of Oaxaca, promulgated in parts between 1827 and 1829, and 
those of Bolivia, Costa Rica and Peru, promulgated respectively in 1830, 1841 and 1851, which were modeled on the 
French Civil Code. 
34  In order to reaffirm the independence of the Netherlands from Spain, and to reunify its different provinces under one new 
nation, various Dutch authors of the XVII century advocated for the sovereign right of the state to dictate laws binding for 
everyone within its territory. As a consequence, foreign laws were applied only exceptionally when the state so decided 
as a matter of comity (Pereznieto Castro, 1985, pp. 298-300). Comity has been traditionally referred to as an act of mere 
courtesy or deference, however, it can also be construed as a directive of the legal order addressed to the judge (Niboyet 
& Geouffre de la Pradelle, 2009, pp. 129-30) and Briggs (2011, pp. 87-92).
35  He was invited by the Chilean government to do so, after having represented the revolutionary interests of Chile, Colom-
bia and his home country, Venezuela, in England, where he lived for almost twenty years (Samtleben, 1979, p. 180). 
inhabitants of the Republic, including foreigners”. 
Dalmacio Vélez Sarsfield drafted the Argentinean 
Civil Code of 1869. He was also influenced by 
the Dutch doctrine, which he learnt through the 
work of Joseph Story, the most important figure 
of territorialism in North America. Vélez Sarsfield 
made a clear statement for territorialism at the 
very beginning of the Argentinean Civil Code. He 
drafted article 1 practically over Bello’s provision 
and specified at the end: “residents or temporary 
residents”. It is clear that, under these provisions, 
anyone who is in the territory of these countries 
is subject to their laws, and that no other law is 
applicable to them therein. 
Neither of these men was completely insensible to 
the application of foreign laws, but for them, it was 
more a matter of necessity having regard to the in-
ternational nature of social relations, contrary to 
Savigny, who shaped European conflict of laws in 
the same period under a universal, i.e. open ap-
proach. Driven by sovereignty ideas and ideals, 
Bello in particular would never have accepted that 
foreign law could apply in his country only because 
the nature of the concrete situation called for it. 
Rather, foreign laws could be applied as an excep-
tion based on comity, or because a given situation 
already vested rights abroad, and it would be un-
practical not to apply the foreign law under which 
these were produced (Samtleben, 1992, p. 150). 
Thus, the very essence of Bello’s doctrine was that 
the law of a given country has power and authority 
exclusively within the territory where it is enacted 
(1992, p. 150). This fundamental idea connects to 
another one just as fundamental, and along with it 
completes the general theory of conflict of laws of 
this author and lawmaker. If the laws of the coun-
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territories, only the judges of the given enacting 
countries, and no others, may apply them. For this 
pioneer of Latin American conflict of laws, the ap-
plicable law was thus closely related to jurisdiction 
(pp. 150 and 153).
In the field of contracts, Bello’s territorial approach 
translated into a choice of law regime that left very 
little room for the application of foreign laws. His 
most important legacy is article 16 of the Chilean 
Civil Code, which is still in force and provides, in its 
third paragraph, that the performance of a contract 
in Chilean territory subjects the effects of the con-
tract to Chilean law, regardless of the place of con-
clusion. If the contract is to be performed in Chile, 
Chilean law governs the whole legal regime of the 
contract, and, when it is not, the Chilean code sim-
ply does not provide a solution.36 Bello’s and Vélez 
Sarsfield’s territorial approach to conflict of laws 
in general, and this specific choice of law rule in 
particular, were adopted, sometimes in response 
to specific, yet slightly different, social realities,37 
36  Foreign law may only be applied in the case of a contract validly concluded under the laws of a foreign state in regard to 
property located in Chile (Chilean Civil Code, Article 16, paras. 1 and 2).
37  Mexico’s approach to foreign laws was rather open at the moment of independence, and it remained so until the 1920s, 
when the triumph of the revolution gave a nationalistic sentiment to many laws, including the federal civil code of 1928 
(Pereznieto Castro, 1985, pp. 330-334). It is only in 1988, after important reforms were introduced in this code, that 
Mexico opened again, and this time completely (at least at federal level), to the application of foreign laws, by adopting a 
universal conflict of laws regime. 
38  Strongly influenced by Story and by authors who shared the views on conflict of laws of Savigny, like Brazilian Augusto 
Teixeira de Freitas, Vélez Sarsfield approach to conflict of laws was very eclectic. He construed the Argentinean Civil 
Code of 1869 in a territorial manner in regard to the personal statute, leaving however some room for the application 
of foreign laws (articles 6, 7 and 8), but did provide for a bilateral choice of law rule for contracts (articles 1.205, 1.209 
and 1.210). 
39  Bolivia (at least for commercial contracts), Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and El Salvador. Honduran codes are ex-
tremely incipient in this field of law; they do not contain a provision that could allow to ascertain a specific approach to con-
flict of laws. It could thus be inferred that the role of foreign law is restricted. The same is true for Puerto Rico, though its 
civil code is currently being reformed and many changes are expected soon, including the admission of party autonomy. 
The situation is different in Nicaragua. Its civil code provides for bilateral choice of law rules in the field of contracts, but 
nowhere in its law is there an indication of freedom of choice in international contracts. 
40  See Albornoz (2010). See also Vial Undurraga (2020, 2018) and Revoredo de Mur (1994). The different treaties on 
private international law concluded at a multilateral level by the different Latin American countries among them, have 
not clarified the issue. What is more, this regime seems to expose the difficulties towards the acceptance of freedom 
of choice. For instance, the Convention on Private International Law (Bustamente Code) concluded under the aegis of 
the OAS in 1928, probably the most meaningful among these treaties for the purpose of an empirical type of research 
like this, considering the number of contracting states and its universal scope, recognizes the tacit will of the parties, but 
provides at the same time that such will results in the application of specific laws: in the case of pre-formulated standard 
contracts, the law that prepares them, and the common personal law of the parties in all other contracts, and, failing this, 
the law of the place of conclusion. Furthermore, some of the countries that have ratified the convention, have made res-
ervations in the sense of excluding its application when contrary to their laws.
41  Such provisions have been in force in Argentina since 2016, in Cuba since 1988, in the Dominican Republic since 2014, 
in Guatemala since 1990, in Mexico since 1988, in Panama since 2008, in Paraguay since 2015, in Peru since 1984, and 
in Venezuela since 1999. The development of free trade that took place in the region from the 1980s played an important 
role in the evolution of a territorial choice of law system into a more universal one, including the acceptance of freedom 
of choice (Juenger, 1997, pp. 196-197, 203).
42  Before 1916, Brazil choice of law rules were very similar to those contained in Bello’s Chilean Civil Code. Since, the 
relevant laws have provided for a bilateral choice of law system. See generally Samtleben (1985). Actually, Brazil did 
not inherit a territorial approach to conflict of laws as the Hispanic countries did. Contrary to Spain, the Portuguese 
empire was open towards the application of foreign laws, and Brazilian independence did not take place in a dramatic 
fashion, like it was the case in most of the Spanish colonies of the continent (Samtleben, 1979, pp. 187-88). Neverthe-
less, whether or not a territorial approach prevails is still a matter of controversy. First, because despite the existence of 
bilateral choice of law rules, traditionally, Brazilian jurisprudence seems to provide for the application of local law. Sec-
ond, because the Civil Code of 1916 expressly admitted freedom of choice, but then the Lei de Introdução às normas do 
Direito Brasileiro of 1942, a law whose objective is to clarify and complete different important aspects of Brazilian law, 
in several Hispanic American civil codes,38 and they 
still remain in some of them.39
Territorialism hindered the admission of party au-
tonomy in many Latin American states (Albornoz, 
2010). Surveys of Latin American scholars have 
shown that, while certain countries allow freedom 
of choice in international contracts, the law is at 
best unclear in this respect in many others.40 Free-
dom of choice is relatively recent among the coun-
tries that allow it. Nine Latin American countries 
(out of a total of twenty –including Puerto Rico–) 
have incorporated freedom of choice in their leg-
islation in the last decades.41 But Brazilian law, for 
instance, still lacks a clear admission of freedom of 
choice and, despite the efforts of scholars to iden-
tify legal arguments supporting freedom of choice, 
and the existence of certain cases which could be 
favorably interpreted, the extent to which choice 
of law clauses are enforceable in Brazilian courts 
remains unclear (Albornoz, 2010, note 21, pp. 44-
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pressly rejects party autonomy.43 Among all Latin 
American countries, this characteristic is specific 
to Uruguay and it may well also draw from Bello’s 
territorial ideas.44 Bello never addressed the issue 
of allowing the parties to an international contract 
to choose the applicable law, but this goes hand in 
hand with the cornerstone of his theory, i.e. the 
exclusive application of the law of the enacting 
state.45 It is true that the 1941 appendix contains 
bilateral choice of law rules in different fields, but 
the completing postulate of Bello’s ideas, which 
states that jurisdiction is subject to the applicable 
law is explicitly present,46 and also strikingly given 
the time of its conception. The territorial approach 
also hindered the acceptance of international arbi-
tration and the freedom that it entails (Jana, 2015, 
p. 420). This changed in the 1990s when many 
Latin American states adopted legislation regulat-
ing arbitration (2015, p. 422) and providing for the 
freedom of parties to choose the applicable law in 
international cases.47 In particular, several states 
adopted legislation mirroring closely the UNCIT-
RAL Model Law.48 
Territorialism might well be in decline in Latin 
America, and party autonomy on the rise. It re-
mains, however, that old habits and conceptions 
die hard, and that commercial parties may con-
tinue for years to be reluctant to dissociate the 
forum and the applicable law. The data might 
reveal such reluctance. It should be underlined, 
misses out the issue while addressing the choice of law rule in the field of contracts, and now, the current civil code of 
2002, which revokes that of 1916, simply does not address any of these issues.
43  Article 2403: “The rules of legal and judicial jurisdiction determined in this Title cannot be modified by the will of the par-
ties. It can only act within the scope that the applicable law confers to it”. Thus, if the Uruguayan choice of law rule desig-
nates as applicable a law that accepts party autonomy, the Uruguayan judge could give effect to the will of the parties to 
the extent established in the applicable law. 
44  Though it comes from a rule directly taken from the Additional Protocol to the 1940 Montevideo treaties, which received 
more influence from Savigny, Story, Teixeira de Freitas and Vélez Sarsfield (Samtleben, 1985, pp. 274-275). 
45  Story and Vélez Sarsfield did not address it either, but Savigny and Teixeira de Freitas arguably did. Contrary to Savigny, 
the ideas of the Brazilian author did not really impact positive law, at least not at the national level. 
46  Article 2401: “The judges of the State whose law governs international legal relationships, have jurisdiction to hear the 
proceedings arising from those relationships. Patrimonial personal claims can also be exercised, at the will of the claim-
ant, before the judges of the country where the defendant is domiciled”. This does not contradict article 2403. Contrac-
tual claims belong to this type of claim, hence a Uruguayan judge may exercise jurisdiction in a lawsuit arising from a 
contractual claim governed by a foreign law in application of the Uruguayan choice of law rule for contracts, i.e. lex loci 
executionis (article 2399). 
47  Mariana Pargendler has argued that the existence of the public policy exception will always limit the enforcement of 
choice of law clauses, as courts may find that foreign law violates public policy and thus apply the law of the forum instead 
(2012, p. 1730). In a commercial context, the argument is exaggerated: the public policy exception is typically interpreted 
restrictively and rarely applied, even in Latin America. It holds even more true before arbitrators: see above text accom-
panying note 3. 
48  See, e.g., Argentinean International Commercial Arbitration Act No. 27449 of 2018; Chilean International Commercial 
Arbitration Act No. 19.971 of 2004; Costa Rican Act on International Commercial Arbitration based on the Model Law 
of the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) No. 8937 of 2011; Uruguay International 
Commercial Arbitration Act No 19636 of 2018. See also Colombian Act on National and International Arbitration No. 
1.563 of 2012.
49  Data from arbitral institutions show that the majority of contractual disputes arise two to three years after the conclusion 
of the contract. 
50  As the majority of contractual disputes arise two to three years after the conclusion of the contract, and our data relate to 
arbitral proceedings initiated in 2011 and 2012, we refer to trade of Latin American countries in 2009.
however, that the data are based on cases which 
were litigated in the early 2010s, and which arose 
out of contracts concluded a few years before.49 
They reflect, therefore, practices which are a de-
cade old. 
B. Importance of the U.S. as an Economic Partner 
The United States is the most important trading 
partner of Latin American countries, and the most 
important source of foreign direct investments 
(FDI). As far as trade is concerned, the World Bank 
reports (WITS, n.d.) that, in 2009,50 almost 37% 
of Latin American and Caribbean exports were to 
the U.S., while 19% were to other Latin American 
and Caribbean countries and close to 15% to Eu-
ropean and Central Asian countries. In the same 
year, more than 31% of imports of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries came from the U.S, while 
20% came from other Latin American and Caribbe-
an countries and 16% from European and Central 
Asian countries. As far as FDI are concerned, the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean reports that the U.S. accounted for 25% 
of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean in years 
2006-2010 (ECLAC, 2011, p. 41).
The weight of the U.S. in Latin American trade and 
FDI should logically entail that Latin American par-
ties conclude more international sales contracts, 
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cial contracts, with corporations based in the U.S. 
than with corporations based in any other country 
in the world. Of course, trade and FDI are macro-
economic concepts which do not directly trans-
late into individual transactions. Nevertheless, it 
is submitted that they are reasonably good prox-
ies for the proportion of individual transactions 
concluded between the economic actors of the 
relevant countries, or group of countries. It will 
be assumed, therefore, that about 30% of interna-
tional commercial contracts of Latin American par-
ties were concluded with U.S. parties at the end 
of 2000s. 
While the U.S. is the most important trading part-
ner of Latin America, the bargaining power of U.S. 
parties in individual transactions is not necessarily 
high. It might not be in a variety of case scenarios, 
in particular where other foreign companies are 
competing for the contract. It is submitted that the 
higher bargaining power of one of the parties can 
be revealed by the fact that the country of origin 
of that party was chosen both as the seat of the ar-
bitration and as the jurisdiction providing the sub-
stantive law governing the contract. The ICC data 
show that parties to ICC arbitrations chose both a 
U.S. seat and the law of a U.S. state respectively in 
11% and 18% in 2011 and 2012. These were likely 
cases where the bargaining power of U.S. parties 
was high.51 But the ICC data also show that, in 
2011 and 2012, the parties chose in respectively 
11% and 3.7% of cases a U.S. seat and the substan-
tive law of another country, which was almost al-
ways Latin American.52 It is likely that most of these 
cases involved contracts concluded by a U.S. party 
and a Latin American party where the bargaining 
power of the U.S. party was not particularly strong. 
Finally, in certain cases, the Latin American party 
had a stronger bargaining power and could impose 
its country of origin both as the seat of the arbi-
tration and as the jurisdiction providing the sub-
stantive law governing the contract: some cases 
reported by Latin American arbitral institutions 
likely suit this model.
The data reveal that the U.S. can be attractive as 
a seat of the arbitration. As already mentioned, 
besides the cases where the parties chose a U.S. 
state both as the seat and as the jurisdiction pro-
viding the applicable law, there are cases where 
the parties chose a Latin American law and a U.S. 
seat. In addition, the data reveal that, in a remark-
51  The same phenomenon is probably at play when parties choose to arbitrate under the aegis of ICDR, as the vast majority 
of ICDR proceedings have their seat in the U.S. and are subject to the substantive law of a U.S. state. 
52  In 5 out of 6 cases in 2011, and in all (two) cases in 2012.
53  This was the case, in particular, in two Salvadorian single nationality cases in 2011, which were both arbitrated in the U.S., 
under Salvadorian law.
ably high number of cases, the parties choose the 
seat of the arbitration, but not the applicable law. 
In such cases, the U.S. is the preferred venue (see 
Table 14). This suggests that, from the perspective 
of Latin America, the U.S. appears as an attractive 
venue. One possible explanation is that certain 
Latin American parties may want to find a neutral 
venue where they can safely, and confidentially, 
resolve their disputes. Indeed, the ICC data reveal 
that some Latin American parties may choose to 
arbitrate domestic disputes in the U.S.53
By contrast, the data do not show any particular 
attractiveness for the laws of U.S. states. The data 
reveal, first, that they are never chosen in arbitra-
tions handled by Latin American arbitral institu-
tions. The data relating to ICC arbitration reveal 
that they are chosen in a proportion of the cases 
which is inferior to the likely proportion of cases in-
volving Latin American and U.S. parties. It is there-
fore also likely that, in the vast majority of cases 
where the laws of a U.S. state was chosen, one of 
the parties to the transaction was a U.S. party, and 
that the law of a U.S. state was chosen because the 
bargaining power of that party was higher than the 
one of the Latin American party. By contrast, there 
is no sign that the laws of U.S. states are chosen 
as laws of a third state, i.e. in transactions where 
none of the parties is based in the U.S. This is con-
sistent with a previous study of one of the authors 
on the laws chosen by parties to Asian arbitrations, 
(Cuniberti, 2016) where it was shown that, despite 
the claim that international business transactions 
are dominated by English and U.S. laws, only Eng-
lish law is regularly chosen as a third law in Asian 
business transactions, while U.S. laws are only 
chosen in transactions involving a U.S. party. The 
laws of U.S. states are not more attractive in Latin 
America than they are in Asia. A major difference, 
however, is that English law is not either. There is 
no third law consistently chosen in Latin American 
business transactions.
One of the authors has argued elsewhere that it is 
hard to identify any substantive rule of English law 
which could explain its attractiveness (Cuniberti, 
2014, p. 497). Rather, the reason seems to relate 
to the presence of English lawyers in many parts 
of the world and, in particular, throughout Asia, in-
cluding in the Asian offices of American law firms 
(Cuniberti, 2016). Before we wonder about the 
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importance with respect to the influence of foreign 
laws, it should also be underlined that a factor in 
the influence of English law in Asia could arguably 
be that England was an important colonial power 
there, and that some of the leading legal centers 
(such as Singapore or Hong Kong) in Asia are com-
mon law jurisdictions closely following the English 
lead (Cuniberti, 2014, p. 490). In Latin America, the 
colonial powers were essentially Spain and Portu-
gal. It could thus have been imagined that Spanish 
and Portuguese laws would have played a compa-
rable role in Latin America. The data reveal that this 
is not the case: Spanish and Portuguese laws are 
virtually never chosen. This suggests that the colo-
nial past, as such, is not an important factor in the 
attractiveness of commercial laws.54
C. Who and Where Are the Lawyers?
Parties to international commercial contracts are 
often advised by lawyers. Where the applicable 
choice of law rule allows, these lawyers should 
inform their client that they need not choose the 
same law as the place of the seat of the arbitra-
tion, or the law of the place of performance of 
the contract, but may choose any law. In practical 
terms, however, lawyers have an interest in advis-
ing their client to choose the law of a legal system 
in which they are admitted to practice and offer 
legal advice. Otherwise, they might lose the client 
to a lawyer admitted to practice in the law that the 
parties would ultimately choose, both at the stage 
of conclusion of the contract and, as the case may 
be, for future work related to the resolution of any 
dispute that may arise between the parties. This 
is a typical agency problem (Posner, 2000): the in-
terests of the lawyers might be different from the 
interests of their client.
A crucial factor in the choice of the laws governing 
international business transactions in a given part 
of the world is thus the availability and the pres-
tige of foreign lawyers55 in that part of the world. 
If the most prestigious law firms in a given legal 
market are the local offices of foreign firms staffed 
with lawyers educated in and practicing only for-
54  It must be underscored, however, that a few Latin American cases are arbitrated in Spain under Spanish law. We are 
grateful to Mrs. María Arias Navarro for indicating to us that the Corte Española de Arbitraje of the Chamber of Com-
merce of Spain has handled a few cases involving Latin American parties, including single nationality cases (Peruvian), 
cases involving Spanish parties (Spanish v. Mexican, Spanish v. Ecuadorian) and cases between a European and a Latin 
American party (Swedish v. Bolivian). All had their seat in Madrid and were governed by Spanish law.
55  By foreign lawyers, we do not refer to the nationality of lawyers, but to their willingness to advise on matters of foreign law. 
See Posner (2000). 
56  We assume that lawyers willing to advise on matters of foreign law (if only for insurance purposes) would have received 
primary education in the foreign legal system and be admitted to a foreign bar. We further assume that holding a master’s 
degree from a foreign law school (e.g. a U.S. LL.M.) does not suffice. An interesting question is whether being admitted 
to the NY bar, associated with some experience in a NY firm, might suffice: see Curtis (n.d.).
57  Study excluding mainland China, for which data were unavailable.
eign law, the chances are high that clients will be 
told, and convinced, that foreign law would be the 
best suited law to govern many of their interna-
tional contracts.56 By contrast, if very few foreign 
lawyers are active in a given legal market, most 
clients will turn to local lawyers who will advise cli-
ents to choose, if possible, local law to govern their 
international transactions. In a previous study con-
ducted by one of the authors, it was shown that a 
big part of Asia corresponds to the first model (Cu-
niberti, 2016).57 English and American firms have 
opened offices in many Asian states (Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Japan for instance). These offices are 
typically staffed with lawyers trained in the British 
common law (but rarely with U.S. lawyers, even in 
the local offices of U.S. law firms). As a result, Asian 
clients can easily find lawyers trained in the British 
common law. This important presence of British 
lawyers in Asia is correlated with the dominance of 
English law on Asian international business trans-
actions, which is often chosen as a neutral law.
The data on choice of law in Latin American inter-
national arbitration reveal that there is no such 
dominance of English law or the law of any other 
state of the northern hemisphere in Latin America. 
Quite to the contrary, parties to Latin American 
transactions seem to choose primarily the laws 
of Latin American states. This begs the question 
whether this is because there are very few foreign 
lawyers in general, and common lawyers in par-
ticular, active in Latin American states.
Until recently, the presence of international law 
firms in Latin American countries was very limited 
(Gómez & Pérez-Perdomo, 2018, p. 18). In certain 
countries like Brazil, the national legal sector is 
strongly protected, and the local bar association 
imposes severe restrictions which make it difficult 
for foreign law firms to enter into the local mar-
ket. By contrast, other countries have opened their 
local markets to foreign firms (2018, p. 19). This 
has long been the case of Mexico and Venezuela, 
for instance. In Mexico, a number of international 
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Whatever the specific regime regulating the prac-
tice of the law for foreign lawyers in the different 
Latin American states, the fundamental issue is 
whether there are many foreign lawyers present 
on these markets. Below, we briefly review the 
composition of certain leading foreign firms estab-
lished in the three biggest Latin American markets. 
“It is not an exaggeration to say that the legal pro-
fession in Mexico is unregulated” (Meneses-Reyes 
& Caballero, 2018, p. 182). The one and only real 
condition to practice law in the country is to obtain 
a law degree from a Mexican university (Ley Regla-
mentaria del Artículo 5º Constitucional).58 There 
are not real bars that would admit lawyers into the 
practice of law, but rather, associations of lawyers 
organized as trade associations or guilds, that are, 
in some cases, “seen as elitist organizations” (Men-
eses-Reyes & Caballero, 2018, p. 183).59 These 
characteristics of the legal profession in Mexico 
clearly suggest that there is no specific regime to 
practice foreign law in this country. As a result of 
the signing of NAFTA in the mid-1990s, many “new 
competitors appeared as branches of international 
law firms, especially from the United States” (2018, 
p. 184).60 Most of them, however, got associated 
with local firms in order to compete in the local 
market and be able to deal with the intricacies of 
the Mexican legal system and practice.61 Two of 
the biggest offices of international law firms are 
the offices opened in Mexico City by Hogan Lovells 
with 18 partners (Hogan Lovells, n.d.) and White & 
Case with 22 partners, including 10 local partners 
(White & Case, n.d.). The education of the partners 
based in each of these two offices is similar. All of 
these lawyers received their primary legal educa-
tion in Mexico. About two thirds of them (in each 
office respectively) completed their education by 
attending a U.S. or U.K. university. Despite working 
in an Anglo-American or American firm, none of 
them is a fully trained U.S. or English lawyer. 
58  Each of the other 31 Mexican states has a law of the kind. For those holding a foreign law degree, there is the possibility 
of having it recognized by the ministry in charge of education. 
59  And there “are also no significant requirements for lawyers to become associated in order to offer services jointly” (Men-
eses-Reyes & Caballero, 2018, p. 182)
60  But it was not easy at the beginning. There were “attempts to establish limits and barriers to prevent the participation of 
foreign law firms and lawyers in Mexico. Some legal organizations even opted to expressly prohibit their members to as-
sociate with foreigners offering legal services in Mexico” (Meneses-Reyes & Caballero, 2018, p. 184-185).
61  Multinational law firms also “subcontract local services to be able to claim ‘local knowledge’” (Meneses-Reyes & Cabal-
lero, 2018, p. 191)
62  It seems, however, that at least one firm established in Buenos Aires has long specialized in the practice of New York law 
although none of its lawyers had received their primary education in the U.S. The firm might have considered that the 
combination of being admitted to the NY bar and experience in the New York office was sufficient for this purpose.
63  This strategy has been pursued by Mayer Brown and Baker & McKenzie. Linklaters also established a cooperation agree-
ment with a local firm but terminated it in 2012 after the Brazilian bar confirmed the restriction on the practice of law in 
Brazil by foreign firms.
64  This strategy has been pursued by Skadden, for instance: the Sao Paulo office includes two partners and two other 
resident lawyers (and a partner attached both to the New York and the Sao Paulo offices) who are all admitted as foreign 
consultants (or only admitted in New York).
In Argentina, only graduates from Argentinean 
law faculties would be admitted to the local bar 
and may practice Argentinean law. But it does not 
seem that there are restrictions on foreign law-
yers to practice foreign law. A few international 
firms have established small offices in Buenos Ai-
res. Cleary Gottlieb established an office in 2009, 
which consists today of one partner, a counsel 
and a couple of associates. The partner and the 
counsel both received their primary education 
in Argentina and completed it with a U.S. LL.M. 
(Clearly Gottlieb, n.d.). A few years later, Curtis 
Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle also opened an of-
fice in the Argentinean capital. It is much bigger, 
as it built on an alliance previously established 
with a local firm. Unsurprisingly, all 10 partners 
and counsel, who previously constituted an in-
dependent Argentinean law firm, were educated 
primarily in Argentina, with half of them holding 
a U.S. LL.M. (Curtis, n.d.). Finally, all 15 partners 
in the Buenos Aires office of DLA Piper received 
their primary education in Argentina, with 10 of 
them completing it with a U.S. graduate degree 
(DLA Piper, n.d.). This brief survey suggests that 
the presence of foreign lawyers on the Argentin-
ean market is very limited.62
In Brazil, although there is no statutory provision 
prohibiting the practice of law by foreign lawyers, 
the Brazilian Bar Association has long enacted a 
provision (Provimento Nº 91/2000) preventing 
lawyers who are not admitted to the Brazilian bar 
to practice in Brazil, except as foreign law consul-
tant (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, 2000). As 
a result, foreign firms have followed three strate-
gies. The first has been to establish associations 
with Brazilian law firms.63 The second has been to 
open small offices staffed with lawyers admitted as 
consultants in foreign law.64 The third has been to 
open small offices staffed with a mixture of law-
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ted as consultants in foreign law.65 Firms following 
either the second or the third strategy introduce in 
the local market foreign lawyers available to advise 
local clients, including on foreign contract law. The 
chances that Brazilian clients might be convinced 
of the advantages of submitting an international 
contract to a law other than Brazilian increase ac-
cordingly. However, it seems that, for the time be-
ing, these foreign lawyers are very few, and were 
even less at the end of the 2000s. Their impact 
on choice of law by Latin American parties is thus 
likely limited.
IV.  CONCLUSION: THE LATIN AMERICAN MAR-
KET FOR CONTRACTS
In many parts of the world, freedom of choice of 
the law governing international contracts has cre-
ated the conditions of an international market for 
contracts. Commercial parties are free to choose a 
law suited to their needs even if it is unrelated to 
their contract. In recent years, some national law-
yers’ associations have competed for international 
contracts through marketing materials that pro-
mote their contract law (Law Society of England 
and Wales, 2007; Alliance for German Law, 2012). 
These marketing efforts demonstrate that elites 
in at least some jurisdictions believe that there is 
an international market for contracts in which it is 
worth competing (Vogenauer, 2013; Rühl, 2013).
Is there a similar market for international contracts 
in Latin America? The conditions for its existence 
have gradually been established. The power of 
commercial parties to freely choose the law gov-
erning their transaction is now widely recognized 
in the context of international arbitration. Parties 
willing to choose a law for its intrinsic qualities may 
do so if they also include an arbitration clause in 
their contract. Our study reveals, however, that 
parties to Latin American international transac-
tions barely use their power to choose a law other 
than the law of origin of one of the parties, and 
rarely dissociate the seat of the arbitration from 
the law governing the transaction. This suggests 
that their choices are essentially dictated by the 
relative bargaining power of the parties and the 
appeal of resolving disputes at home, before an ar-
bitral tribunal sitting in the jurisdiction and apply-
ing the law of the party who was able to impose his 
preferences. In contrast, parties seem to choose 
the law of a third country in rare circumstances. 
If there is a Latin American market for contracts, it 
does not seem to be very active.  
65  This seems to be the strategy of Cleary Gottlieb, for instance: the Sao Paulo office includes two partners educated abroad 
and admitted in New York, and a counsel and 10 associates who received their primary legal education in Brazil and are 
admitted to the Brazilian bar.
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